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OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Woods appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
petition.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm, albeit on an alternative basis.1 
I. 
 Because we write exclusively for the parties, we set forth only those facts 
necessary to our disposition.   
 Woods was charged on April 10, 2001, with first-degree murder by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the killing of his brother, and his trial in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia did not begin until December 9, 2003, 973 days later.  
After the complaint was filed, Woods was brought before the Municipal Court of 
Philadelphia for a preliminary hearing (continued upon joint request from April 25, 2001, 
to May 15, 2001), and his case was listed for status in the Court of Common Pleas.  On 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 1 The attorneys for the appellant are appearing pro bono.  We express our gratitude 
to those attorneys for accepting this matter pro bono and for the quality of their 
representation of their client.  Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest service that 
members of the bar can offer to indigent parties and to the legal profession. 
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July 6, 2001, the court granted the defense’s request for a psychological evaluation to 
determine Woods’s competency to proceed to trial and excluded the time periods from 
July 6, 2001, to September 10, 2001, for speedy trial purposes under Pennsylvania Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 600 (“Rule 600”).  The competency evaluation was completed on 
September 17, 2001, at which point the case was again continued to September 24, 2001, 
with the time excluded.  On September 24, 2001, the case was “spun out” to a different 
judge and continued to October 11, 2001, at which point it was continued for another day 
until October 12, 2001, because defense counsel was not available.  On October 12, 2001, 
the case was continued to November 8, 2001, to facilitate plea negotiations, with the time 
excluded.  On November 26, 2001, the court granted Woods’s attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and new counsel was appointed.   
 During the next hearing on March 26, 2002, the court declined to change the 
original trial date of July 15, 2002, which was marked “E.P.D.,” apparently an 
abbreviation for “earliest possible date.”2  The period from November 26, 2001, through 
July 15, 2002, was not excluded.  On July 15, 2002, the defense sought a continuance, 
and the proceedings were continued until January 21, 2003.  On January 21, 2003, 
defense counsel said that he was working on a capital trial and was unavailable, and the 
case was continued until July 21, 2003, with the time ruled excludable.  The next hearing 
occurred on July 30, 2003; the judge was unavailable due to illness, and the proceedings 
                                              
 
2 In its brief and at oral argument, the Commonwealth has contended that the case 
was marked for the earliest possible date on March 26, 2002, and again on September 15, 
2013, upon the Commonwealth’s request, Comm. Br. 14, but such requests are not clear 
from the record before the Court. 
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were continued until September 15, 2003.  On September 2, 2003, Woods submitted a 
pro se motion for dismissal of charges on speedy trial grounds.  See Appendix (“App.”) 
at 39.  The court did not consider Woods’s pro se motion because he was represented by 
counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 410 A.2d 880, 883 (Pa. 1979).  On September 
15, 2003, the case was listed for a two-to-three-day trial and continued to November 13, 
2003.  That day, the Commonwealth and defense counsel jointly requested a continuance, 
and a status conference was set for November 19, 2003, with a trial on December 8, 
2003.  On December 8, defense counsel was unavailable, and the case was delayed until 
December 9, 2003, when Woods’s trial commenced. 
 After his conviction and an unsuccessful counseled appeal, Woods filed a pro se 
collateral petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq., in which he argued, inter alia, that his trial counsel had 
been ineffective for failing to file a speedy trial motion under Rule 600.  He filed the 
petition on March 5, 2008, and he was later appointed PCRA counsel.  After the PCRA 
court dismissed his petition, Woods appealed.  Appointed counsel filed a statement of 
issues complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 
1925(b) (“1925(b) statement”) that did not include the Rule 600 ineffectiveness claim.  
On June 28, 2010, Woods was granted permission to proceed pro se.  On June 29, 2010, 
Woods filed a “Motion to File Emergency Amended Statement of Matters Complained of 
on Appeal.”  App. 129.  In that motion, he complained that he was denied his right to a 
speedy trial under Rule 600 and the United States Constitution and that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to advance a speedy trial argument.  Id. at 130.  That motion was 
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stamped “Filed in Superior Court,” id. at 129, but it is not listed on the Superior Court 
docket sheet,  id. at 136.  Woods then filed his PCRA appellate brief in the Superior 
Court on August 9, 2010, in which he included speedy trial and ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Id. at 140-89.   
 On September 30, 2010,3 Woods filed a second motion to add a claim to his 
1925(b) statement regarding the competence of the minors who testified against him, and 
the Superior Court remanded the motion and the record to the Court of Common Pleas 
with instructions to Woods “to file with the trial court and serve upon the trial judge a 
supplemental Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, raising the 
one issue referenced in his motion to supplement the record.”  Id. at 193.  Woods thus 
filed a supplemental 1925(b) statement raising only the claim regarding the minors’ 
competence.  The Court of Common Pleas denied that claim on November 17, 2010, and 
on July 19, 2011, the Superior Court affirmed the denial by the Court of Common Pleas 
of Woods’s PCRA petition.  The Superior Court concluded that Woods had waived his 
claim of ineffectiveness based on failure to raise a speedy trial claim and his 
constitutional speedy trial claim because he “failed to present the claims either in his 
original Rule 1925(b) statement or in his supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement.”  Id. at 
207. 
 On April 4, 2012, Woods filed a pro se petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 
the District Court.  The Magistrate Judge concluded in her Report and Recommendation 
                                              
 3 The motion is signed with a date of September 27, 2010, but the Superior Court 
stamped the motion as having been filed on September 30, 2010.  See App. 190-91.  
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(“R&R”) that Woods had procedurally defaulted the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim by failing to bring it in his amended 1925(b) statement.  Id. at 14-15.  The District 
Court, over Woods’s objections, approved and adopted the R&R, dismissed the petition, 
and declined to grant a certificate of appealability.  Id. at 3-4.  We granted the request for 
a certificate of appealability with respect to two issues:  (1) whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the charges against Woods under Pa. R. Crim. 
P. 600, and (2) whether Woods’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.  
Woods, through counsel, timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  AEDPA limits our review of 
claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, such that we may not grant relief unless 
the state court proceeding: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  We review de novo claims, such as Woods’s, that were not 
adjudicated on the merits in state court.  See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
III. 
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 Woods argues here that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for 
dismissal under Rule 600; and (2) the Commonwealth violated his constitutional right to 
a speedy trial.  The District Court approved the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Woods 
procedurally defaulted the claims.  We conclude that, whether or not Woods procedurally 
defaulted the claims, his petition clearly fails on the merits.4 
A. 
 We first consider Woods’s claim of ineffectiveness of counsel for failure to move 
for dismissal under Rule 600.  A petitioner claiming ineffectiveness must show (1) “that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) 
“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688, 694 (1984).  In evaluating an attorney’s conduct under Strickland, we “must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance,” and a defendant must overcome the presumption that 
“under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy.”  Id. at 689 (quotation marks omitted). 
                                              
 4 The Commonwealth has asked us to ignore the procedural default question and 
decide the case on the merits.  Given the straightforward merits issues and comparatively 
difficult state procedural issues, we will do so in this case.  See Lambrix v. Singletary, 
520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (“Judicial economy might counsel giving the [merits] question 
priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas 
the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(2) (permitting a federal court to deny a habeas petition on the merits 
notwithstanding the applicant’s failure to exhaust state remedies).”). 
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 Woods argues that the Commonwealth was required to bring him to trial within 
365 days of filing the complaint.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 600(A).5  Excluded from this 
calculation are periods of time resulting from the unavailability of the defendant or his 
attorney, or from continuances requested by the defendant.  See id. at (C)(3).  “[T]he . . . 
filing of a pretrial motion by a defendant . . . render[s] him unavailable . . . if a delay in 
the commencement of trial is caused by the filing of the pretrial motion” and the 
Commonwealth “exercised due diligence in opposing or responding to the pretrial 
motion.”  Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d 578, 587 (Pa. 1999).   
 Even where the defendant was not brought to trial within 365 non-excludable 
days, the Commonwealth could defeat a motion to dismiss charges on speedy trial 
grounds by showing that it “exercised due diligence” in prosecuting the case “and the 
circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond [its] control.”  Id. at 591 
(quotation marks and alteration omitted).  “Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis” and “does not require perfect vigilance and 
punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has 
been put forth.”  Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(en banc).  Rule 600 “encompasses a wide variety of circumstances under which a period 
of delay was outside the control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the 
Commonwealth’s lack of diligence.”  Id. at 1103.  
                                              
 5 Rule 600 has recently been amended; we apply the version in effect at the time of 
Woods’s pretrial proceedings.   
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 Although it may be that more than 365 non-excludable days passed before 
Woods’s trial, the Commonwealth could have argued in response to a Rule 600 motion 
that much of the delay was a result of the defense’s actions, or at least beyond the 
Commonwealth’s control and therefore not indicative of a lack of diligence.  Woods’s 
trial counsel could reasonably have foreseen the Commonwealth’s argument and 
concluded that a Rule 600 motion would be unlikely to succeed and that pursuing the 
motion would divert his time and attention from preparing the defense.  In short, Woods 
has not alleged a Rule 600 claim so meritorious as to overcome the strong presumption 
that counsel’s decision not to pursue it fell within “the wide range of professionally 
reasonable assistance” that constitutes effective assistance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
Consequently, we hold that Woods cannot prevail on his claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise the Rule 600 issue.  
B. 
 We now consider Woods’s claim that he was denied a speedy trial in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment, which we will review as a Strickland claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel, notwithstanding Woods’s assertion that the issue is before us as both a 
Strickland claim and a standalone speedy trial claim.6   
                                              
 6 Woods contends that his PCRA submissions, although inconsistent and 
ambiguous in their characterization of the constitutional speedy trial claim, should be 
read liberally and collectively to have raised the issue as both a Strickland claim and a 
standalone claim.  Woods does not deny, however, that counsel failed to raise the 
constitutional speedy trial issue in the original trial court or on direct appeal.  Failing to 
do so would generally bar consideration of the issue as a standalone claim on collateral 
review, and in dismissing his PCRA petition for a different reason (Woods’s failure to 
present the claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement), the state court does not appear to have 
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 In determining whether a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial has occurred, courts employ a balancing test, considering the “length of 
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 
defendant.”  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  The four factors are “related . . 
. and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.”  Id. 
at 533.  The first factor acts as “a triggering mechanism,” and as the Commonwealth 
concedes, 973 days is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry.  See Comm. Br. 20.   
 The second factor, the reason for the delay, weighs heavily against Woods.  A 
large portion of the delay, including the period from July 15, 2002, until July 30, 2003, 
was the direct result of continuance requests by defense counsel.  Moreover, no period of 
the delay was attributable to a continuance request solely by the Commonwealth.  
Though delays caused by the courts “should be considered,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 
here, much of the delay was due to defense counsel’s continuance requests. 
 The third factor weighs neither for nor against Woods.  As we explained in United 
States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673 (3d Cir. 2009), in order to show that he asserted a speedy 
trial right at the time of the delay, a defendant who was represented by counsel “should 
identify ‘a motion or some evidence of direct instruction to counsel to assert the right at a 
time when a formal assertion would have some chance of success.’”  Id. at 681 (quoting 
Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 766 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Viewing this factor through the 
                                                                                                                                                  
found otherwise.  Further, while before the District Court, Woods lodged no objection to 
the Magistrate Judge’s characterization of both the Rule 600 and constitutional speedy 
trial issues as Strickland claims in the R&R that was later approved and adopted by the 
District Court.   
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lens of Woods’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is not dispositive that trial 
counsel acquiesced in the delay.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 536 (acknowledging the 
possibility of “a situation in which an indictment may be dismissed on speedy trial 
grounds where the defendant has failed to object to continuances” if “the defendant was 
represented by incompetent counsel”).  Woods did eventually attempt to assert his speedy 
trial right through his pro se motion filed in September 2003.  But Woods himself had, by 
all appearances, acquiesced in the delay for nearly two and a half years before filing the 
pro se motion, and it is unlikely that a speedy trial motion submitted by counsel would 
have succeeded in September 2003.  Overall, this factor is neutral in our analysis.  
 The prejudice factor is close, but it ultimately weighs against Woods.  Woods 
complains of prejudice in the form of mental suffering and anxiety while awaiting trial 
and the impaired ability to participate in the preparation of his defense, both of which the 
Supreme Court has recognized as relevant to a speedy trial assessment.  See Barker, 407 
U.S. at 532.  The Commonwealth notes, and Woods concedes, that of the pretrial period 
Woods spent incarcerated, he would have been incarcerated for at least twelve months on 
other charges.  On November 30, 2001, he pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver 
a controlled substance and was sentenced to three to twelve months of incarceration, see 
Supplemental Appendix (“S.A.”) 3, and on March 7, 2002, he pled guilty to the probation 
violation of carrying a firearm without a license.  See id.; see also Woods Reply Br. 18; 
Comm. Br. 25-26.  With regard to prejudice to Woods’s ability to prepare his defense, 
although it may have been more difficult for Woods to communicate with his attorney 
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while he was incarcerated, the delay presumably also aided Woods’s defense, as it 
allowed his attorney the time that he requested to prepare for trial. 
 Considering all these factors together, Woods’s trial counsel could have 
reasonably concluded that a constitutional speedy trial motion, like a motion under Rule 
600, would consume scarce time and resources but have little chance of succeeding.  
Woods therefore cannot overcome the “strong presumption” that his trial counsel acted 
“within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689, in not raising the constitutional speedy trial issue.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
